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Considerable debate rages about whether Federal Reserve policy was too lax in the early part of the
2000s, thereby fueling the home-price bubble that was the proximate cause of the global financial
crisis.  We present evidence that the view that modest alterations to monetary policy have vast consequences
is inconsistent with theory and not supported by evidence.  We take a close look at the responses of
asset markets to changes in the short-term policy interest rate since the founding of the Fed in 1914.
Changes in the federal funds rate have no systematic effect on either long-term interest rates or housing
prices over nearly a century.  Indeed, since the mid-1990s the policy rate had a negative relationship
with long-term interest rates.  This is consistent with a global view of capital markets where massive
cross-border flows shape the availability of domestic credit and asset prices.  The evidence casts doubts
on arguments that a moderately different monetary policy path might have mattered.
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The Federal Reserve’s conduct of monetary policy casts a spell over market participants, 
commentators, and academics.  The pages of financial newspapers parse subtle differences 
among the comments of Fed officials and delve deeply into potentially multiple meanings of 
official statements.  Academic discussions argue that the path of the policy rate may (as in 
Taylor, 2009) or may not (as in Bernanke, 2010, and Greenspan, 2010) have fueled a home-price 
bubble in the United States. 
The view that modest alterations to monetary policy have vast consequences for national 
economies would seem to be inconsistent with theory and evidence.  Most modern economic 
models (represented authoritatively by Woodford, 2005) offer limited scope for policy surprises.  
The basic logic is that spending depends on decisions capitalized over the longer term, and small 
perturbations in the level of the short-term interest rate do not matter much to those values. More 
fundamentally, the prominence accorded to authorities controlling nominal magnitudes seems to 
undervalue the resilience of market economies, which are supposed to be efficient in grinding 
out appropriate relative prices so as to employ resources efficiently.  In other words, if central 
bankers are crucial to moderating the operations of capitalist economies, then capitalist 
economies may have serious drawbacks.       
We will argue that this fascination with the Fed is also at odds with the evidence by 
taking a close look at the responses of asset markets to changes in the short-term interest rate 
since the founding of the Fed in 1914.  In fact, there are apparent effects on either long-term 
interest rates or housing prices.  We will also show that the policy rate more recently had no 
systematic relationship with long-term interest rates.  A global view of capital markets casts 
doubt on those arguing that a different policy path might have crucially mattered. 2 
 
The conclusion is similarly wary of outsized expectations of monetary policy makers and 
explains why pride goes before a fall. 
Saying that modest changes in monetary policy would not matter much does not imply 
that monetary policy makers are irrelevant.  They can do great ill by losing the story line and 
forgetting their role in providing a stable backdrop of price stability.  Small mistakes also 
cumulate. Easy monetary policy from 2002 to 2006, as well as a lack of sensitivity to the dangers 
posed by the build-up of credit, contributed to the over-valuation of financial assets and the 
subsequent crisis.  Predictability in monetary policy encouraged short-termism in financial 
markets.  But were we able to walk back the path that the world took, changes to supervision and 
regulation would most likely loom larger still in shaping economic outcomes in the 2000s. 
The limits of monetary policy in theory 
Two properties of most macroeconomic models are especially relevant to the conduct of 
monetary policy.  First, spending and pricing decisions are assumed to be based on long-term 
assessments of real income and real rates of return.  Second, changes in monetary policy can 
only change real interest rates temporarily.  Ultimately, the forces of productivity and thrift 
determine them, not changes in nominal magnitudes on the central bank balance sheet.
1  
Combining the two propositions implies that the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy, as long as 
it stays within the narrow range of experience, would not be expected to have a significant or 
long-lasting imprint on markets or activity. 
John Taylor (2009), among others, demurs in that view.  In particular, the Federal 
Reserve is held to have systematically run policy too loose from around 2002 to 2006, which 
encouraged the housing boom and the related financial market excesses.  However, the 
                                              
1 Obviously, this is a source of debate among economists.  We follow the textbook presentation along the lines of 
Woodford (2005).  Akerlof and Shiller (2009) provide a stark counterpoint.  3 
 
deviations from Taylor’s preferred policy were modest.  Such sensitivity of outcomes to those 
misses is hard to square with the propositions that the Fed can only keep the short real rate low 
for a limited time and that it is long-term values that matter. 
An example can make the point clearer.  Finance theory posits that a capital asset is 
valued as the present value of expected future income.  Such assets include homes, long-term 
government and corporate debt instruments, and durable goods, but stock prices are the simplest 
to model (as explained in Shiller, 1989).  With equities, the income comes in the form of 
dividends, and the discount factor is the real short-term interest rate plus a risk premium.  
As shown in the memo items of Table 1, from 1914 to 2006, the real one-year risk free rate 
(using the one-year Treasury rate less the year-ahead percent change in consumer prices as the 
proxy) averaged about 1-1/4 percent, equities gave a return in excess of that of about 7-1/8 
percent, and real dividends expanded 1-1/8 percent per annum.  Calculating the present value 
of equities at those historical averages is straightforward. 
The entries of Table 1 assess how those present values change if the real interest rate 
were one percentage point higher than its long-term average.  As the shaded area in the bottom 
row attests, a permanent increase in real rates has a powerful effect on capitalized values, 
ranging from hits of 13 percent (if the equity premium matched its average) to 78 percent (if the 
equity premium were zero).  It is results such as this that creates the perception that the Fed has a 
powerful lever on the economy.   
 4 
 
But the prior from theory is that the Fed’s ability to raise real interest rates is fleeting, at 
best.  Hence, the upper rows of the table are more relevant.  Those entries provide the effects on 
 
present values if the real interest rate is kept higher by one percentage point for the time (in 
years) given in the row stub.  As is evident, tighter policy that succeeded in raising real rates for 
as long as three years would knock from 1 to 3 percent from the capital value of assets.  To view 
this as a source of policy leverage that could materially and exclusively changed events of the 
past few years is to assume implicitly that the economy is not well anchored by real phenomena. 
Table 1
Effect of a one-percentage point increase in the real
short-term interest rate on the present discounted value
of all future dividends
Years for which the Change in present value, percent
real short-term interest Equity premium is assumed to be:
rate is held one average one-half
percentage point higher: 1914-2006 the average zero
1 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0
2 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9
3 -2.6 -2.7 -2.9
4 -3.3 -3.6 -3.8
5 -4.0 -4.4 -4.8
10 -6.8 -8.0 -9.3
forever -13.3 -25.1 -78.4
Memo:  Average from 1914 to 2006, percent
Real short-term interest rate 1.27
Real growth of dividends 1.85
Dividend/price ratio 4.46
Equity premium (short-term real return  7.11
  on equity less the real
  short-term interest rate)
Source:  Shiller (1989 and 2005) and authors' calculations.5 
 
The limits of monetary policy in practice 
If the Federal Reserve served a critical role in stabilizing the economy, then presumably 
it should leave a systematic imprint in financial markets.  The data from Shiller (1989 and 2005) 
provides a helpful resource for testing this proposition, giving long time series on Treasury 
yields, equity and house prices, and consumer prices.  The green line in the upper panel of Figure 
1 plots annual observations on the one-year Treasury rate over the existence of the Federal 
Reserve, from 1914 to 2010, from the Shiller dataset.   
 
We coded these observations, with year-on-year increases of more than ¼ percentage 
point representing a tightening, decreases of more than ¼ percentage point representing an 
easing, and variations in the ½ percentage point range bracketing zero representing no change.  
The bars in the lower part of Figure 1 show the results, with 1 and -1 corresponding, 
respectively, tightening and easing of monetary policy.  This simple rule accords surprisingly 
Figure 1
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well with narrative information of policy decisions.  For instance, the dating from Federal 
Reserve correspondence of the tightening cycle from 1988 to 1992 in Reinhart and Simin (1997) 
matches the rule-based characterization.  There are about an equal number of easing and 
tightening episodes (20 of the former and 21 of the latter), which also about split up equally the 
years of the Fed’s existence.  In about one-fifth of the years, the policy stance did not differ 
materially from the year before.
2 
The five panels of Figure 2 show the cumulative frequency distributions over the 
tightening and easing policy stances for nominal short- and long-term yields and the one-year 
realized nominal returns on long-term Treasuries, the S&P 500 Composite equity index, and 
home prices.
3  As is evident and reassuring to the policy identification strategy, the tightening 
regimes (the blue sold line) are associated with a higher short-term rate than the easing regimes 
(the red dashed line).  But there are no significant differences in the outcomes for long-term 
Treasuries and home prices.  Equity markets do produce outsized returns in tightening episodes.  
We may be observing the policy reaction function of monetary policy restraint in a booming 
share market, not a changed inducement to hold equities for different policy rates.
                                              
2 An alternative identification scheme is to code unchanged years as a continuation of the prior stance.  Nothing that 
follows would change had we adopted that rule. 
3 Redoing the figure for real returns produces identical results. 7 
 8 
 
Asserting that monetary policy restraint would be associated with a notable constriction 
of asset prices is evidently inconsistent with the Fed’s history.  Of course, there are many 
problems associated with categorizing outcomes.  Keeping in mind the “post hoc, propter hoc” 
argument made famous by Tobin (1970), the results are silent as to causation.  Additionally, a 
policy instrument guided optimally to offset the effects of random and exogenous shocks of the 
goal variable will not be correlated with the goal variable.  But the variables shown in Figure 2 
are part of the transmission mechanism and intermediate to the goal of monetary policy.  That is, 
they are part of channels through which policy affects the goal and apparently almost all 
systematically unrelated to the stance of policy. 
The forgotten open economy 
The lack of association between the stance of policy and key financial market outcomes 
is not an artifact of our near-century-long comparison.  Consider the upper panel of Figure 3, 
which plots monthly observations of the overnight federal funds rate, the ten-year Treasury yield, 
and the rate on thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages from 1972, around the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate system, onward.  For the first quarter-century of the sample, interest rates 
moved closely together.   
The two lines in the bottom panel plot the simple correlation of the changes in the ten-
year Treasury yield and the mortgage rate with changes in the federal funds rate over a five-year 
moving window.  As is evident, these correlations were typically close to one-half.  In the latter 
parts of the 1990s, something happened and these correlations dropped off sharply.  Indeed, for 
the whole of the period when it is asserted that the Fed kept financial conditions too 
accommodative, the policy rate and the most important market yield were negatively related 
(also see Greenspan, 2010, for a related analysis). 9 
 
 
There are many potential explanations for this lack of association and the limited scope 
for the Fed to have sharply altered the course of the past few years.  The most plausible one to us 
is that analysts often focus too intently on the domestic economy.  Probably the most dramatic 
set of events for emerging market economies in the late 1990s was the Asian financial crises of 
1997 to 1998.  The crises were cathartic for authorities in that region, who apparently as a result 
put a very high premium on assuring a reliable export market by managing their U.S. dollar 
exchange rates and building up foreign exchange reserves.   
Figure 3
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The result was a sharp pickup in reserve accumulation, shown for emerging market and 
developing economies in Figure 4.  The bars provide the dollar amounts of annual additions to 
reserves, which peaked at $1-1/4 trillion in 2007.  As shown by the line, authorities in these 
economies were willing to direct the equivalent of around 4 to 7-1/2 percent of their nominal 
incomes to reserve accumulation.  Indeed, as the housing bubble inflated from 2002 to 2006, 
these economies accumulated $2-1/4 trillion of reserves or an average of 4-1/2 percent of their 
GDP.  Statistics from the International Monetary Fund indicate that about two-thirds of those 
purchases were directed to U.S. dollar obligation.
4    
This willing funding by foreign official accounts altered the composition of finance and 
kept the level of long-term interest rates in the United States low.  First, as for the compositional 
effect, foreign official entities loaded up on U.S. government securities, leaving private demands 
unmet.  Into this void, financial engineers constructed AAA-rated dollar exposure by using 
housing collateral to create mortgage-backed securities and collateralized-mortgage obligations.  
The top tiers of those payment flows were rated by the rating agencies as triple-AAA, meeting 
the need, particularly, of foreign banks that were desirous of those securities’ special treatment 
under the Basel II capital rules.   
                                              




This posed a problem for the investment banks that put in motion the process of financial 
engineering.  Underwriting these complicated securities to meet the demand of foreigners for 
AAA-rated credit left them with bits and pieces of securities on the cutting-room floor.  This 
unwanted residue of their own underwritings represented highly leveraged bets on the U.S. 
housing market that proved difficult to remove from their balance sheets.   
The second main consequence of these global savings was to keep U.S. long-term interest 
rates lower than they would have been otherwise.  Any analyst pointing to Federal Reserve 
policy as augmenting the housing boom must first address how the Federal Reserve might have 
had the leverage to do so.  In the event, the simple correlation from 2002 to 2006 between its 
policy instrument and the rate that matters for housing activity was negative and statistically 
insignificant from zero.  Perhaps this reduced-form coefficient represented a concatenation of 
partials effects that in their deep structure allowed the Fed some leeway.  But perhaps not, or 
perhaps not in a manner than would have yielded predictable results. 
Figure 4
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In an open economy, the central bank has less scope to influence the path of globally 
traded financial assets.  Thus, the lack of association between the stance of policy and the longer-
term rates that matter for spending—either broadly stated over the past century or narrowly 
focused on the past decade—should not come as a surprise.  This does not, however, absolve the 
Fed from all responsibility. 
The free flow of international capital irons out yield differentials across world markets by 
facilitating the exchange of financial obligations.  Thus, signals from the market about domestic 
imbalances are not in prices but rather in quantities.  And there were signals.  In particular, the 
benign mortgage rate environment of the 2000s was associated with a marked scaling up of 
household liabilities.  As shown in Figure 5, the total liabilities of the U.S. household sector rose 
about 25 percentage points of nominal income from 2002 to 2006, virtually all of which was 
accounted for by mortgages. 
The leverage of households was rationalized at the time by the strong equity component 
of balance sheets—the housing equity component.  The more than 20 percentage point decline in 
owners’ equity (the solid line) commencing in 2005 showed the fragility of those underpinnings.  
As we demonstrated in Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), a distinct leverage cycle similar recurred in 
the fifteen most severe financial crises of the past century.
5 
                                              
5 Geanakoplos (2010) makes a forceful argument for recognizing the importance of the leverage cycle. 13 
 
 
The United States, by the way, was not alone.  Figure 6 plots the annual pairs of the 
growth of domestic credit and nominal GDP for 11 advanced economies from 2000 to 2009.  
About three-quarters of the observations lie above the 45 degree line, implying sustained and 
widespread reliance on leverage.  This suggests another avenue that has been unexplored by 
those criticizing Fed policy.  Many other economies had systemic banking crises and fell into 
recession.  Some of them had their own currency and an independent monetary policy (Iceland 
and the United Kingdom), and some did not have their own currency and a monetary policy 
dictated by a foreign capital (Ireland and Spain).   How could Fed decisions been so central to all 
those shared dislocations?  Moreover, none of the major economies that exhibit a “fear of 
floating” as in the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and have to keep their domestic monetary policies 
aligned with the Fed had systemic banking crises.  Why did the problems attendant to easy 
monetary policy, asserted to be central to our imbalances, stop at our borders? 
 
Figure 5
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The historical record does not provide a platform to support an outsized role for the 
Federal Reserve in avoiding the financial crisis.  But as financial market prices tend to overshoot, 
so too do reputations.  The fall in the Fed’s standing in the past few years owes importantly to a 
correction of its build-up in the years before.  In part, putting the Fed pride of place in explaining 
the Great Moderation left its reputation vulnerable when the economy left its sweet spot.  After 
all, pride does go before a fall. 
  
Figure 6
Growth of domes tic credit relative to nominal income
Annually across 11 economies from 2000 to 2009, percent
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